March 7, 1977

Monday

In the Laurel anniversary ceremonies and dinner at the house of Sotero and Lorna Laurel in San Juan, the Laurels were unanimous in the criticism of the fact that we and the Philippines seem to be begging for mercy from Libya and the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Ghaddafi because we were holding the negotiations in Tripoli on what is fundamentally an internal matter between Filipinos.

I could not reveal the deeply hidden purpose I had that we must by all means show to the world and more importantly our people (including the Muslins) that the Muslim secessionist movement is foreign inspired and foreign-supported—that it is exported war—and that it is aimed at dismembering our territory through a puppet group of Filipinos, the MNLF [Moro National Liberation Front].

I have always believed that the Americans lost the Vietnamese war because the North Vietnamese succeeded in showing to the world and the people of Vietnam (including the South Vietnamese) that South Vietnamese opposition was foreign-inspired and foreign supported and was aimed at the division of Vietnam through the puppet regime of Ngo Dinh Diem.

We have succeeded in showing the MNLF for what they are—a puppet group acting on the instructions of a foreign power against the interest of the Filipino people.

This we have already succeeded in achieving. We must not lose it. We must keep reminding our people of it.

With this truth firmly supporting our efforts, even if hostilities should be resumed we are bound to win!

So we must probe through the plebiscite—to show the support of the people for the Republic and our Armed Forces.

We received the report of USec. [Carmelo] Barbero by telephone from Hongkong, where he is resting. The entire National Security Council listened to the report through the loudspeaker phone.

It was recommended by him to send the First Lady to Tripoli. And through the DFA [Department of Foreign Affairs] we received the cable of the Libyan Foreign Minister that President Ghaddafi would be happy to meet with her at any date convenient to her.

Her mission would be to invite him to come to the Philippines.

March 8 and 9, 1977[1][2]

Tuesday and Wednesday

March 8

We are preparing for Imelda’s trip to Libya.

I have come down with a severe cold and flu and am as miserable as can be.

March 9

We held the last planning session of the National Security Council where I outlined the objective of the Mission of the First Lady, its composition, the possible formulas that could be acceptable to us in the way of a solution to the impasse in the negotiations, and the scenario in case all our efforts at negotiations fail.

On the 1st—To invite Pres. [Muammar] Ghaddafi

Composition—Include Sec. [Juan] Ponce Enrile, Sec. [Jose] Aspiras, USec. [Jose] Ingles, Maj. Gen. [Fidel] Ramos, Maj. Gen. [Fabian] Ver, ViAdm. [Romeo] Espaldon (at the insistence of Imelda) Vice Admiral ______, BGen. [Ignacio] Paz, Amb. Castro.

Acceptable solutions:

Single autonomous region of merged Regions 9 and 12;

Two regions with autonomous gov’t. [government]—9 and 12;

Provisional gov’t.;

Cooperative organization for administration of ten provinces.

Scenario—Prepare to hold plebiscite organize autonomous governments and undertake hostilities.