January 4, 1970

Apr 20, 2026

[p.8] Ex-President [Diosdado] Macapagal, who is visiting in Singapore, says that he is shocked by the news that there is supposed to be a secret agreement for the Sabah claim to be relinquished by the Philippines after the resumption of the diplomatic relations.

There is no such agreement. I used Mr. Moon Park and Mr. Chang Ming Thien as emissaries to Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman and Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak so that they would agree to the resumption of diplomatic relations. The Tungku had insisted on such relinquishment of the claim and a recognition, formally, of the sovereignty of Malaysia over Sabah but I refused and they finally agreed that after diplomatic relations, our two peoples should get used to each other traveling in our respective countries before we spoke these matters. The Filipinos should now go to Sabah and invest there.

VP [Spiro] Agnew, in Thailand and Taipeh, has said that I asked him whether America was slowly withdrawing from Asia and he had answered in the negative. I asked Pres. Nixon the same thing. He was more vague, although when he reached the U.S. he did say what Agnew is saying now.

What I want to know is what bases they are going to keep in Asia and what troops, where, and under what arrangements.

Agnew is quoted as saying he had told me that he had made me understand, and that he told me [p.10] that, of course, the number and location would change with the need.

He told me nothing of the kind.

On the last day of his stay here, Jan. 1st, when I talked to him about the U.S. helping us on our present balance of payments problem, he was evasive. I did not press the point.

Either he has no power to commit the U.S. or he is still feeling his way around.

During the conference at 11:30 AM of Dec. 31st where I met all the special envoys of 44 governments who attended my inauguration, the only matter on which there was some vestige of promise of help was on studies of typhoons and their control. [U.S.] Ambassador [Henry] Byroade[1] is supposed to follow this up.

I impressed on V[ice] P[resident Spiro] Agnew that we in Asia could not make any plans on our security if we did not know their plans but that however even in such a state of ignorance we in the Philippines are moving to prepare to defend ourselves on our own.

He invited me to come to the U.S. after September 1970—preferably not while the other heads of state are in the U.S. on the UN anniversary. I made no comment on the exact date but did promise to go.

[p.11] Pres. Nixon and VP Agnew strike me as very evasive about helping the Philippines now although they are supporting us in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] on our efforts to get dollar loans.

I am skeptical about the wisdom of a trip to the U.S.

I have told [Foreign] Sec. [Carlos P.] Romulo repeatedly that there should be no further talks of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines and our wish to remove them as we will use this as the “ultimate weapon” in the trading that may be needed to obtain recognition of our special preferences in the American market. For if our quota on sugar is not extended by the Sugar Act extension this year or by treaty in the replacement of the Laurel-Langley agreement, then the sugar industry is wrecked and our economy may be disastrously affected.

So I have told VP Agnew that before the formal negotiations on trade and security start, we should have an understanding as to what terms such negotiations would arrive at. I said that I would like Amb. Byroade to be able to sit down with me on this.

[p.12] Rod Reyes, editor of the Manila Chronicle, has just told Kit Tatad that they are planning to serialize the libelous book [The Untold Story of Imelda Marcos] of Chit Navarro [Carmen N. Pedrosa] on Imelda.

We have to watch the Lopezes and Montelibano. They are still sore for my veto of their franchise to operate a telephone and telecommunications company anywhere in the Philippines and the Mivue-–a cable television company that would select programs from any of the television companies without permission from the latter to be flashed to their subscribers by cable. Both were illegal and unconstitutional but they took offense at the veto.

They are the worst oligarchs in the country.

I must stop them from using the government for their own purposes.

Piding [Alfredo] Montelibano [Sr.] is working on the reclamation project of Republic Real Estate—pending adjudication in the courts.

Iñing [Eugenio] Lopez [Sr.] strongly urged that I appoint Piding as Secretary of Finance as if the position were vacant. This was a repetition of the recommendation in 1965.

[p.13] Peace and order must be attended to.

I must work at the programs for exports and tourism.

Then I must appoint the replacement of Gov. [Alfonso] Calalang as Governor of the Central Bank.[2] The IMF [International Monetary Fund] consultative group arrives on Jan. 10th.

There are more than 100 CFI [Court of First Instance] vacancies, 7 Court of Appeals, one in the Supreme Court and another vacancy coming up in February.

The Armed Forces has too many hold-overs who should be retired.[3]

We must change the strategy in Central Luzon against the Huks. We must restudy the use of civilians either as agents or informers.

There are three basic problems that I am personally attending to:

Peace and Order

Balance of Payments

Land Reform

Exports and Tourism come under the 2nd and Central Luzon under the 1st.

MALACAÑANG

[1] Henry Byroade was U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, 1969-1973. In a 1988 Oral History conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library, available online, he said: “ Yes. Marcos had been in power about four years; was President when I got there. He was reelected just a month before I got there. Then, during my tenure things got very much worse in the Philippines, daily demonstrations, riots, which turned into violence. The Government almost fell apart. Senior politicians had their own private armies; everybody had a gun. It was a lawless society, and boom, along came martial law. I worked very hard on Marcos to keep him from doing that. ” [147]

[2] Alfonso Calalang . Third Governor of the Cent r al Bank of the Philippines, 1968-1970.

[3] Chronicle on January 2, 1970 reported that overstaying generals in the military was a challenge to Marcos. O nly Rafael Ileto Commanding G eneral Phi ippine Army wa s not retirable , with term till 1973, AFP wants Marcos to retain Generals: Yan, Espino , Rava , l and Lomibao . Also Menzi.

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