December 21, 1976

May 22, 2024

Thai Prime Minster Thanin Kraivichien tried to revive the Seato [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] as well as establish some kind of a bilateral military arrangement with the Philippines outside ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations].

I convinced him this is unnecessary and even dangerous.

We should fight subversion and insurgency on the principle that each country assumes this responsibility. Help should be limited to intelligence exchange as well as of information.

This is embodied in the Joint Communique.

No Official Gazette entry for this day.
This is one of two entries for December 21, but as there is no time indicated (unlike the other entry), it is unclear which entry was written first.

Office of the President of the Philippines

Manila

Were there any instance when the conference threatened to fail?—

Yes on Dec. 21, 1976. When the dinner given for us by Prime Minster Thanin Kraivichien at the Manila Plaza was going on, USec. [Carmelo] Barbero called me up desperately from Tripoli to inform me that the conference was being terminated by the Four Man Committee of the Islamic Conference because we would not agree to the inclusion of Palawan, Cotabato Sur and Davao [del] Sur in the Muslim Region of Autonomy.

How about the visit of the First Lady?

Yes on the 3rd and 4th days of the visit. Again the visit threatened with failure because there was a demand that the First Lady’s party and she herself meet with Nur Misuari which would have given the MNLF [Moro National Liberation Front] which included complete federalization or autonomy which of course was unacceptable.

This undated text comes after one of the December 21, 1976 entries in the PCGG PDF.

Tanggapan ng Pangulo ng Pilipinas
(OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES)

December 21, 1976
Tuesday 3:00 AM

I have just talked to President [Muammar] Ghaddafy, Dr. Ali Al Treki and Under Secretary [Carmelo] Barbero by long distance telephone for about fifty minutes—from 2:00 AM to 2:50 AM.

Dr. Ali Al Treki, Libya’s Foreign Minister is again the voice of the MNLF [Moro National Liberation Front]. He insists that the Special Muslim Regional Government should include not only the ten provinces of the present Regions IX and XII which are Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga [del] Sur, Zamboanga [del] Norte, Lanao [del] Norte, Lanao [del] Sur, North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat but also the provinces of Davao [del] Sur, Cotabato Sur and Palawan.

I told him that there would be more trouble in Mindanao if these provinces are included as the inhabitants would probably go to the hills and fight the government. And even as he insisted that this was only for purposes of administration, I pointed out patiently that Palawan is as far away as the map will show while Davao Sur and Cotabato Sur and inhabited by Christians and are not a historical part of the Muslim region.

He (Dr. Treki) claimed he has done all he can to get concessions for us from the Special Committee of Four of the Islamic Conference which is now in Tripoli which is composed of the representatives of Senegal, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Libya with Sec. Gen. Amadon Karim Gaye acting as head, Under Sec. Barbero, talking to me in Ilocano said that he, Dr. Treki, is calling all the shots and except for perhaps Saudi Arabia, guides the members by the nose.

Pres. Ghaddafy cannot speak English too well and we could not hold a sustained debate beyond amenities. So I had Under Secretary Barbero point out in the map to him how contiguous the present Regions IX and XII are and how the three other provinces of Davao Sur, Cotabato Sur and Palawan are not. UnderSec. Barbero says he seems to have been convinced by me but “the small one” (deydiay bassit) is holding out.

Dr. Treki talked to me a second time and when we were talking of my proposal that we hold a referendum on the three additional provinces he suggested that a referendum he held in all of Mindanao and Palawan. However, when I accepted this with too much alacrity, he withdrew it or rather avoided it by claiming a referendum would mean a delay in a ceasefire.

When I talked to Pres. Ghaddafy a second time, I appealed to him to convince the other members of the Four-Man Special Committee of the Islamic Conference and he agreed to do so the following morning, although Dr. Treki kept saying that Sec. Gen. Karim Gaye and the

This is one of two entries for December 21, but it is unclear which entry was written first because the other entry has no time indicated.

representative of Senegal was leaving the following morning.

Pres. Ghaddafy promised to send me a cablegram after the meeting with the Four Man Committee.

I instructed UnderSec. Barbero to prepare a memorandum showing the developments and how reasonable we have been by conceding nine points and refusing the tenth. This will also include Dr. Treki’s withdrawal of the referendum proposal.

Dr. Treki also threatened that if we do not accept their proposal, that would be the end of the conference, there would be no farther conferences before the Islamic conference where they would have to report failure.

But UnderSec. Barbers recommends a recess if we cannot agree on this proposal now.

Actually, if we were inclined to be mischievous we could agree to the proposal and the Christians would outvote the Muslims in this region.

11:25 PM

While the dinner by the Thai Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien was going on (during dessert) I received the call of USec. Barbero.

He told me that he had seven points to convey:

  1. The Committee of Four of the Islamic Conference blames the Philippines for the breakdown of the negotiations
  2. The Committee will recommend to the Islamic Conference that no further negotiations be undertaken with the Philippines
  3. The Islamic Conference will continue to discuss the question of the Muslims in the Philippines
  4. The matter will be reported to the Secretariat of the U.N. [United Nations] for U.N. action.
  5. The Islamic Secretary General will notify all members of the Islamic Conference to take such appropriate measures against the Philippines.
  6. Request Pres. Marcos to submit a compromise
  7. Pres. Ghaddafy has not yet sent a cable on the developments to Pres. Marcos.

USec. Barbero feels the threats are by Minister Al Treki to compel compliance with his wishes.

I directed that USee Barbers transmit to the Committee of Four and to Pres. Ghaddafy as well as Minister Al Treki that I offer as a compromise:

“We accept the proposals of the Committee of Four subject to the constitutional processes of the Philippines.”

This should satisfy their obsession for a settlement in principle.

1:00 AM December 22, 1976

We called up Pres. Ghaddafy by telephone. Imelda asked him to consider the compromise proposal I offered which should not be objectionable. He repeated his request for Imelda to go to Libya to “fix things up,” of course he did not insist when told it takes sixteen hours to fly to Libya.

He agreed to confer with the Committee of Four of the Islamic Conference again “tonight” which would be an hour or a few hours from then.

For there is a six hour time difference between Libya and the Philippines.

I am optimistic that they will accept the compromise. Although Imelda is not.

 

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