The concatenation of events has compelled me to notify Deputy Secretary of State Charles Robinson that we (The Philippines) would be compelled to denounce or terminate the Mutual Defense Pact if the ambiguities in the responsibility of the United States under the Pact are not clarified.
I met with Dep. Sec. Robinson (Sec. [Henry] Kissinger’s principal assistant) for breakfast at 8:00 AM. He was accompanied by Ambassador [William] Sullivan, Asst. Sec. [Arthur] Hummel [Jr.], State Dept.’s Mr. [Rice?], RAdm. [Doniphan] Shelton as Adm. Noel Gayler CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet] could not arrive on time. With me were Sec. [Carlos] Romulo, [Juan Ponce] Enrile, [Cesar] Virata with Amb. [Eduardo] Romualdez, Ex-Vice Pres. [Emmanuel] Pelaez, Sol. Gen. Estelito Mendoza and Gen. Romeo Espino.
I handed Dep. Sec. Robinson our aide memoire (copy of which I attach) and asked that we talk of the matter alone in my study which we did. He asked Amb. Sullivan and Asst. Sec. Hummel to accompany him and I asked Secs. Romulo and Enrile to join us later on Amb. Romualdez.
In their presence I traced the development of our feeling of alarm because of our growing impression that the United States would not come to our aid if we are attacked “unless their bases or facilities are not directly threatened.”
First the [William Stuart] Symington [Jr.] Report, then the indifference of the United States to our plight in Mindanao where we suffered 4,000 KIA [killed in action] and a total of 6,000 casualties, and now the apparently authoritative statement of Ambassador Sullivan during the bases negotiations that an attack on our installations or occupancy by an enemy of Reed Bank or that area apparently including Kalayaan or the Spratlys is not seen by his government as posing a direct threat to the bases since the land area is insufficient to sustain a significant military presence.
I made it clear that we wanted the clarification from Pres. [Gerald] Ford and Sec. Kissinger.
Dep. Sec. Robinson asked to talk to me alone and so we went to my sofa at the rear of the study.
And I told him that the military bases agreement was not getting anywhere because we cannot understand Amb. Sullivan and we have no mechanism of private and confidential consultations whenever there are obstacles although his had been my understanding with the
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ambassador and his predecessor, Amb. [Henry] Byroade.
He made me believe that it was for the interest of both the Philippines and the United States to have the agreement decided upon before the elections because of their understanding or agreements with Incumbent members of Congress.
So I suggested that the clarification of the Mutual Defense Pact be accelerated, then we can work on the bases agreement.
We agreed that this conflict would not be revealed to the public and the negotiations on the bases would continue.