In the future the question will be asked why has President Marcos, who was unashamedly and openly pro-American, fought beside American soldiers in World War II and in the underground, sent Filipino troops to Korea as a member of Congress, supported the Pacific charter as well as the security arrangements between the Philippines and the United States, and later sent Filipino troops to Vietnam, supporting American policies thereat, although not politically palatable at the time in domestic circles, suddenly turned apparently against the United States and demanded the elimination of American control over the military bases and the conversion of the American bases into Philippine bases, although allowing the use of certain facilities for the American air and naval forces in order that American can maintain its effective part in the sea and air lanes of the Western Pacific.
Why the sudden change of front?
The decision to review and re-assess the military arrangements with the United States and to establish a self-reliant defense posture as well as to control the bases and to eliminate extraterritoriality as well as the American flag over the military bases of the United States was the result of a long series of studies, but the proximate causes for the urgency and the need of an immediate policy on the matter were:
- The Philippine experience with the United States foreign policy in relation to the Mindanao secessionist movement.
- The refusal of the United States to comply with its solemn commitment to support South Vietnamese troops both financially and militarily, a commitment made by President [Richard] Nixon before the pull-out of American troops.
The Philippines could have invoked the Mutual Defense Pact when the fighting started in Mindanao and Sulu, for it was quite clear that the arms, the ammunitions, and the training were foreign. Libya, through Colonel Muammar Khadafi, had bragged that they had supported the conspiracy to dismember the Philippine territory. This was amply documented not only by penetration agents of Philippine intelligence authorities but also by captured enemy personnel and equipment that were openly marked “From Your Friends From Libya.”
At the same time Tun Mustafa of Sabah was not attempting to be discreet about his plans to organize a separate state and incorporate therein part of Philippine territory, more specifically, Mindanao, Palawan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and even Basilan.
But since the Philippines under President Marcos, had adopted the position that it would
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never allow foreign troops to fight within its territory when the fighting was between the indigenous forces, I myself with Secretary of Defense as well as the Chief of Staff, personally pleaded with then Ambassador [Henry] Byroade and the CINCPAC Commander in-Chief of the United States Forces, Admiral Noel Gayler, who is the CINCPAC commander up to now, that we be given sufficient arms and ammunitions to meet the new danger in Mindanao and Sulu.
Apparently, because of the inertia from a policy of having treated the Philippines in a cavalierly and taken-for-granted fashion, not only were our pleas and requests disregarded but when we started buying arms from Taiwan, Singapore, and Continental Europe, we were made to understand that this caused the displeasure of the United States.
I was stunned beyond belief that the United States should be so indifferent and cold to our entreaties when they knew full well that all of Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi were in danger of being taken over by the well-armed and funded rebels.
I vowed there and then that the Philippines had to implement our old plan, the self-reliant defense posture.
I was so shocked by the American Congressional action denying further military and financial help to South Vietnamese troops notwithstanding the fact that President Nixon had formally committed this help before President [Nguyen Van] Thieu of Vietnam and agreed to the complete withdrawal of the American troops. This was part of the formal agreement for the alleged termination of the war as far as the United States was concerned.
That the United States could so brazenly disregard an international obligation came as a further shock to me.
I was convinced therefore that it was necessary to confront the United States with our demands for a re-assessment of our security arrangements and the conversion of all American bases into Philippine bases.