I met Admiral N. [Noel] Gayler, CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific Command], today in a breakfast conference.
Before the breakfast I called him into my study with Ambassador [William] Sullivan and Sec. [Alejandro] Melchor [Jr.].
While Admiral Gayler outlined the American position that in the broader prospective of strategy, it was necessary that the United States maintain its present control of the sea and air communications in the Western Pacific.
When I commented and asked him if the assessment I made was correct that there was no threat of external aggression now, he quickly agreed but added only on condition that the United States retains its control over the sea and air of Western Pacific. He pointed out that a war outside the mainland of the China mainland would bring American sea and air power into play, which would make the military bases in the Philippines necessary. He stated the ocean (any strip of water) protects the Philippines from aggression while the U.S. dominates the sea and air.
So I had to reiterate what I had already old Ambassador Sullivan in our meeting privately in the morning of May 21st, 1975—that what he (Admiral Gayler) was confronted with was a military war and what I and our people were confronted with was an ideological and propaganda war. Later I pointed out that more than anything, the revolutionary regimes in Indochina won a propaganda war more than a military war.
The ideas of the revolutionary governments in Indochina are not new, but they will jump oceans and fly the air. Guns and bases are no defense against them.
Later I observed that the propaganda war was lost by the Americans before they lost the military war.
And the old voices on “Philippine puppetry” and “unthinkable extraterritoriality” that the American bases symbolize and physically proved will brand the Philippine government as but a “Trojan horse.” This may not be true but it is credible. We will look like [Nguyen] Van Thieu of South Vietnam.
The day is approaching when the existence of American military bases in the Philippines will be untouchable.
But we (specially I, the President) agree that the American air force and navy should be present in the Western Pacific to neutralize an ambitious Soviet Navy that now shows its intentions in the Indian ocean and interest even in the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan as shown by its latest naval exercises.
Before we reach the day when the foreign bases in the Philippines becomes politically untenable, we must prepare a new arrangement so that the facilities that we can extend to the U.S. Navy and Air Force can be kept without the bases being foreign—but becoming Philippine bases before that day.
They must have known that I was referring to the fact that in 1991 the bases tenure will lapse anyway.
They agreed that certainly we have the inauguration, the foresight and the statesmanship to work out a new arrangement that would keep American dominance over the air and sea but without American military bases in the Philippines.
My impression is Admiral Gayler understands the situation as I outlined it and agrees with my plan in principle.
He told me as we parted that we “would all work on the new arrangement” when I referred to maintaining the facilities available to the U.S. air force and navy without the stigma of foreign American bases on Philippine soil.
I reported “you are met with military combat, Admiral, while I am met with an ideological war.”
Admiral Gayler and Amb. Sullivan, during the breakfast, also accepted the fact that the militant revolutionary regimes—Indo China won and are winning the propaganda war—and because they work 24 hours at it, can insist on the most barefaced lies while we do not believing our good deeds speak for themselves.
Office of the President
of the Philippines
Malacañang